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Metacognition and Cold Control in Hypnosis
The hallmark phenomenological property 
of responding to a hypnotic suggestion is 
the experience of feeling as if one is not the 
author of one’s response, and this has come 
to be known as the classic suggestion effect 
(Bowers, 1981; Weitzenhoffer, 1980). Given 
this marked distortion in volition, it is plau-
sible that higher order thoughts (HOTs), 
which are characterized by an awareness of 
one’s thoughts, experiences and actions, are 
somehow involved in hypnotic responding. 
This idea forms the basis of cold control the-
ory (Dienes & Perner, 2007), which proposes 
that responses to hypnotic suggestions are 
facilitated by inaccurate HOTs regarding the 
intentions underlying one’s responses.
It is on the basis of this theory that 
Semmens-Wheeler and Dienes (in press) ar-
gue that hypnotic responding differs from 
meditation, which they believe is charac-
terized by an enhancement in higher order 
awareness. Here I restrict myself to cold con-
trol theory and consider the evidence for this 
theory and its predictions regarding hypnot-
ic responding. 
According to cold control theory, an al-
teration in metacognition is the primary 
driving force behind hypnotic responding. 
Responses to hypnotic suggestions are pro-
duced by unconscious intentions and are 
experienced as involuntary because of the 
concurrent formation of inaccurate HOTs 
characterized by the absence of awareness 
that one is the author of the intention. For 
example, an individual performs an action 
or modifies a percept or representation (e.g., 
suppresses a memory from breaching aware-
ness) but forms inaccurate HOTs regarding 
her or his role in producing the response 
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(e.g., “I’m not suppressing the memory”). In 
turn, the individual exhibits a reduction in 
awareness of the intention to respond and 
displays the suggested response. The idea 
that hypnotic responding is facilitated by a 
reduction in self-reflective thought has pre-
cedence in earlier hypotheses (e.g., Miller, 
Galanter, & Pribram, 1960) and most nota-
bly Hilgard’s (1986) neo-dissociation theory, 
according to which hypnotic responding is 
facilitated by a disruption of executive moni-
toring functions enabled by an amnestic bar-
rier. However, cold control theory provides a 
more appealing and testable explanation of 
hypnotic responding because it is easily rec-
onciled with contemporary research in cog-
nitive neuroscience and it circumvents many 
of the metaphorical pitfalls of neo-dissocia-
tion theory.
Semmens-Wheeler and Dienes (this is-
sue) describe two studies that sought to test 
cold control theory. On the basis of a previous 
study showing that metacognition depends 
on the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) 
(Rounis, Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham, 
& Lau, 2010), Semmens-Wheeler and Dienes 
argue that disrupting activity in this region 
should reduce metacognition and thus in-
crease hypnotic responding. In the separate 
studies, the authors used alcohol consump-
tion and repetitive transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (rTMS) to reduce frontal func-
tioning and found that both manipulations 
augmented the experiential concomitants of 
hypnotic responses, but not the behavioural 
responses. 
These results are consistent with cold 
control theory but do not convincingly tie 
hypnotic responding to metacognition. The 
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dlPFC is recruited during a wide range of 
cognitive functions including cognitive con-
trol, decision making, and working memory 
(Stuss & Knight, 2002) and the experimen-
tal manipulations likely modulated a whole 
host of cognitive functions. For example, 
both manipulations may have reduced at-
tentional effort. Insofar as expending effort 
during a task facilitates self-agency attri-
butions (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 
1993), reduced effort should augment the 
extra-volitional phenomenology of hypnotic 
responding, which is exactly what the au-
thors observed (for similar ideas, see Barnier, 
Dienes, & Mitchell, 2008). In particular, at-
tributing rTMS effects on hypnotic respond-
ing to a change in metacognition amounts to 
reverse inference, which is valuable in cer-
tain contexts but has important limitations 
in cases where no behavioural measure of 
the respective cognitive function is adminis-
tered, as was the case in these studies. 
Similarly, whilst the results described 
by Semmens-Wheeler and Dienes (this is-
sue) are consistent with cold control theory, 
they do not provide preferential support for 
this account. As the authors acknowledge, 
a number of theories of hypnosis, most no-
tably dissociated control and second-order 
dissociated control theory (Woody & Sadler, 
2008), predict that disruption of neural ac-
tivity in dlPFC will produce an increase in 
hypnotic suggestibility. Insofar as extensive 
meditation practice is associated with greater 
white matter integrity in prefrontal regions 
(e.g., Kang et al., 2012), dissociation theories 
would also predict that such practice would 
reduce hypnotic suggestibility, which is con-
sistent with Semmens-Wheeler and Dienes’ 
report of lower hypnotic suggestibility in 
meditators. Given this level of overlap with 
the predictions of dissociation theories, a 
crucial step for the future development of 
cold control theory will be the derivation of 
predictions that diverge from other theories 
of hypnosis. Toward this end, I will delve 
deeper into the assumptions and predictions 
of cold control theory with a view to identi-
fying viable avenues for further research on 
this theory.
A crucial step for future research is to 
more clearly elucidate how a reduction in 
frontal functioning augments hypnotic 
responding. The inclusion of behavioural 
and self-report measures of metacognition 
during hypnotic responding will allow for 
a clearer assessment of the proposal that a 
reduction in metacognition mediates the 
increase in hypnotic suggestibility following 
the disruption of activity in the prefrontal 
cortex. In turn, this will provide less equivo-
cal evidence regarding whether metacogni-
tion is involved in hypnotic responding and 
will move us closer to the goal of discrimi-
nating between cold control theory and dis-
sociation theories.
At present, it remains unclear whether 
the prefrontal cortex contributes to both 
behavioural and experiential hypnotic re-
sponding and this represents an important 
test of cold control and dissociated control 
theories. Both theories assume that a re-
duction in activity in the prefrontal cortex 
will increase both dimensions of hypnotic 
responding whereas the results of the two 
studies described by Semmens-Wheeler and 
Dienes (this issue) only found effects with 
experiential measures. There seem to be 
three possible explanations for these results: 
1) the prefrontal cortex weakened metacog-
nition (or another cognitive function) but 
this change only modulated the experiential 
concomitants of hypnotic responses; 2) the 
experimental manipulations did not disrupt 
frontal functioning to a sufficient degree to 
effect an increase in behavioural respond-
ing; or 3) the measures of hypnotic respond-
ing used were not sensitive enough to detect 
an enhancement.
The first explanation raises an important 
question about cold control theory. That is, 
how will the formation of inaccurate HOTs 
about the intentions underlying one’s re-
sponses actually improve the likelihood of 
those intentions giving rise to a particular 
hypnotic response? There are two distinct, 
but inter-related, variables at play here: the 
efficacy of an intention in producing an ac-
tion or experience and the awareness of the 
intention. Cold control theory places the 
bulk of the causal influence on the latter, 
whereas the former may actually be more 
fundamental in producing the experience. 
Accordingly, it may be that inaccurate HOTs 
only produce the involuntariness of the ex-
perience — the misattribution of agency to a 
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source other than oneself — and not the ex-
perience per se, which is what the authors 
observed. 
To take this idea further, it needs to be 
acknowledged that, independently of HOTs 
regarding an intention, the efficacy of the 
intention in producing a response still de-
pends on a cognitive ability that enables the 
particular action, percept or representation. 
For motor suggestions (e.g., paralysis), this is 
very simple because such responses are easily 
implemented (I can easily intend to hold my 
arm as if it were paralyzed). This is not the 
case for cognitive (e.g., suppressing a memo-
ry) and perceptual (e.g., generating an audi-
tory percept) suggestions. To a greater extent 
than for the implementation of the motor 
intention, there are individual differences in 
the intentional generation of cognitive and 
perceptual states and for some individuals 
implementing these intentions may not ac-
tually be possible (e.g., Levy & Anderson, 
2008). Whilst necessary for producing the 
extra-volitional phenomenology of hypnotic 
responding, intending to suppress a memory 
and forming HOTs that one is not intend-
ing are not sufficient for hypnotic respond-
ing — one has to actually be able to suppress 
the memory, which implies an ability or set 
of abilities involving the manipulation of 
representations (for a related discussion of 
the role of rogue representations in hypnotic 
responding, see Brown & Oakley, 2004). At 
present, this ability is not specified and it will 
be important for cold control theorists to 
more clearly explicate how percepts and rep-
resentations are generated and manipulated 
in the production of hypnotic responses.
The second and third explanations for 
the lack of an increase in behavioural hyp-
notic responding with experimental manip-
ulations that reduce frontal activity concern 
the methodology of these experiments. The 
second explanation — that the experimen-
tal manipulations did not disrupt frontal 
functioning enough to increase behavioural 
responding — will need to be investigated us-
ing other techniques that interrupt frontal 
functioning to a greater degree. However, it 
is striking that alcohol intoxication impaired 
performance on executive functioning tasks 
but did not influence behavioural hypnotic 
responding. This again may suggest that 
the frontal effect is purely at the level of the 
experiential concomitants of hypnotic re-
sponses. I find the third possibility — that the 
measures of behavioural hypnotic respond-
ing were not sufficiently sensitive to detect 
an effect — to be very likely and I think it 
stresses the need for researchers to move 
away from traditional measures of hypnotic 
responding toward chronometric, psycho-
physical, and physiological measures, which 
will undoubtedly be far more sensitive and 
reliable (Terhune & Cohen Kadosh, 2012). 
Optimizing measures of hypnotic respond-
ing in this way will undoubtedly strengthen 
the chances of discriminating between these 
explanations.
The idea that the efficacy of intentions 
in the production of hypnotic responses 
will depend on one or more abilities and 
is not solely determined by the formation 
of inaccurate HOTs also has implications 
for Semmens-Wheeler and Dienes’ central 
thesis regarding the relationship between 
meditation and hypnosis. Their argument 
that hypnosis and meditation are wholly 
dissimilar phenomena is based on the posi-
tion that a reduction in metacognition is the 
primary determinant of hypnotic respond-
ing. In contrast, responses to suggestions 
may be facilitated by multiple orthogonal, 
or only weakly related, componential abili-
ties (Woody & McConkey, 2003; see also 
Laurence, Beaulieu-Prévost, & du Chéné, 
2008), some of which may be recruited dur-
ing meditation. For example, both advanced 
meditators (Luders et al., 2012) and highly 
suggestible individuals (Horton, Crawford, 
Harrington, & Downs, 2004) display greater 
structural density in the corpus callosum 
than controls. The specific regions are ad-
jacent but not overlapping and the meth-
odologies of these studies greatly differ 
(for a methodological critique of the latter 
study, see Lynn, Kirsch, Knox, Fassler, & 
Lilienfeld, 2007). However this structural 
difference may point to a shared mechanism 
underlying certain componential abilities 
recruited during hypnosis and meditation. 
Notwithstanding this point, although I 
am sympathetic to Semmens-Wheeler and 
Dienes’ position, I think that comparisons 
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between hypnosis and meditation are rather 
limited because empirical studies have not as 
yet circumvented a number of confounding 
variables that differentially contribute to the 
mechanisms underlying these phenomena, 
such as individual differences and training 
effects, thus tempering the weight of any 
contrasts (see Grant, this issue). 
Cold control theory offers a parsimoni-
ous and testable explanation of hypnotic re-
sponding. It also suggests a novel research 
focus — higher order awareness — that has 
received only scant attention in the hypnosis 
literature yet is likely to yield insights into the 
mechanisms underlying hypnotic respond-
ing. It also provides a framework within 
which hypnosis can be contrasted with, and 
perhaps discriminated from, meditation. 
Considering the ability to form inaccurate 
HOTs as a determinant of hypnotic respond-
ing may also advance our understanding of 
individual differences in hypnotic suggest-
ibility (Laurence et al., 2008). Despite these 
strengths, there are important challenges 
ahead for this theory — most notably the 
need to derive predictions that distinguish 
it from other theories of hypnosis. The re-
search that this theory has inspired to date 
has already provided fascinating results that 
can inform the neural basis of hypnosis, ir-
respective of their implications for cold con-
trol theory.
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